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ABSTRACT
Whilst the predecessor (Part I) to this paper addresses criticisms and challenges which have arisen 
in  response  to  recent  Basel  Committee's  initiatives  aimed  at  addressing  capital  and  liquidity 
standards, the present paper highlights further measures which are being introduced by the Basel
Committee to address such criticisms and challenges.
As well as presenting and drawing attention to proposals which could serve as means of addressing 
challenges presented by liquidity risks, Part I of the paper concludes with the result that market 
based regulation is an essential and vital tool in the Basel Committee's efforts to address some of 
the challenges presented by liquidity risks.  The present paper highlights the Basel  Committee's 
acknowledgement  of  this  conclusion.  Furthermore,  it  draws  attention  to  other  areas  which  are 
considered to constitute fertile substrates for purposes of future research.
This paper will also illustrate why the potential of banking regulations and disclosure requirements 
to impact risk taking levels is not only dependent on certain factors such as the dissemination of 
information to  appropriate  recipients,  appropriate  volume of disseminated information,  when to 
disseminate such information, but also on other factors such as ownership structures and effective 
corporate governance measures aimed fostering monitoring, supervision and accountability.
In  arguing  that  additional  leverage  ratios  which  have  recently  been  proposed  by  the  Basel 
Committee will play a key role in facilitating the diversification of banks‘ liquid assets –  via the 
new liquidity standards (Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the Net Stable Funding Ratio), contribution 
is also made to the current discussion on the resilience of the banking sector – albeit  from the 
perspective of the stabilisation of the entire system.
Key Words: liquidity risks, systemic risks, capital, standards, Basel III, moral hazard, disclosure,
information, Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR), Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)
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Preparing for Basel IV (Whilst Commending Basel III): Why Liquidity Risks 
Still Present a Challenge to Regulators in Prudential Supervision (Part II)*
Marianne Ojo1
Introduction
Perspectives and Explanatory Views of Factors Considered to be Contributory to the Severity 
of the Recent Financial Crisis 
It has been concluded and it is also widely acknowledged that the neglect of risk appears to be a key 
theme in the recent Financial Crisis. „ A combination of agency problems and the neglect of risk 
would result in massive risk taking by investors who fail to appreciate the exposures relating to 
certain  investments  –  however,  improving  management  incentives  may  not  suffice.“  Maximal 
transparency, it is further added, might facilitate the recognition of risks.2
The severity and magnitude of the recent Financial Crisis is also attributed to sequential factors and 
events which generated aggregational effects and such amplitude that were to contribute to the most 
devastating global Financial Crisis till date. These series of events (which generated devastating 
consequences), it is stated,3  are attributed to the build up of excessive on- and off-balance sheet 
leverage in the banking sectors of many countries, which was followed by the depletion of capital 
levels  and quality –  whose occurrence was gradual.  It  is  further  argued that  many banks were 
simultaneously retaining inadequate levels of liquidity buffers.4
As well as introducing a hugely legal (as well as financial) perspective to: i) the alternative views 
and explanations attributed to the triggering of the recent Crisis; ii) measures and approaches which 
need to be adopted as well as implemented to address contributory factors, this paper contributes to 
the  present  discussions  on  significant  contributory  factors  to  the  recent  Financial  Crisis,  the 
measures  and initiatives  which  should be  implemented  if  regulatory gaps  are  to  be  effectively 
* Paper presented at the 9th INFINITI Conference on International Finance, Trinity College Dublin, 13-14 June 2011. 
1  Dr Marianne Ojo, Lessing Trebing Bert (LTB) Rechtsanwälte Frankfurt am Main, Germany  and  School of Social 
Sciences and Law, Oxford Brookes University, Headington Campus, Oxford, OX3 0BP.
Email: marianneojo@hotmail.com 
2 Keynote  Speech  by Andrei   Shleifer,  „Alternative  Views  of  the  Crisis“  during  the  Plenary Session  of  the  9th 
INFINITI Conference on International Finance, Trinity College Dublin, 13-14 June 2011. „Three broad views of the 
Crisis were discussed – in particular, how financial institutions got themselves into so much trouble. The three views 
are „too big to fail“, „distorted compensation arrangements“, and „neglect of tail risk“. In particular it was argued 
that the third view provides the most coherent explanation of the various aspects of the Crisis.“ For further reading 
and explanatory information on how „banks exploit national  safety nets and increase instability in the financial 
system,“ see P Molyneux, K Shaeck and T Zhou, „Too Systemically Important to Fail in Banking“
 In addressing the  problems relating to how financial institutions got themselves into serious difficulties, as well as 
how to address huge gaps in the regulation of financial institutions as highlighted by the recent Financial Crisis, 
legal and economic perspectives have been put forward. Financial regulation is a topic which strongly interconnects 
financial institutions , regulatory and supervisory authorities, standard setting bodies, as well as legal frameworks.
3  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework For More Resilient Banks 
and Banking Systems“ at page 9 of 77 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf
4  Such series of events were considered to be responsible for the inability of the banking system to absorb „the 
resulting systemic trading and credit losses „ as well as its inability to cope with „the reintermediation of large off-
balance sheet exposures that had built up in the shadow banking system“; ibid  http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf
addressed. One significant problem of Basel II is that, to an extent, the Basel II framework had not 
been  implemented  qualitatively  (with  the  expected  level  of  consistency  or  transparency)  or 
quantitatively at the time of the onset of the Financial Crisis in 2007. Furthermore, in cases where 
Basel II had been implemented, its internal risk models had proved to be unduly sensitive. The 
generation of pro cyclical effects is another issue which arose from its implementation.
As well as the rise and subsequent collapse of US house prices being attributed as an underlying 
factor in the recent Financial Crisis,5 other factors such as the procyclical deleveraging process and 
the interconnectedness of systemic institutions through an array of complex transactions, are also 
considered to be responsible for the resulting magnitude of the Crisis. The implementation of new 
Basel III rules which are aimed at improving the quality and quantity of capital to be retained by 
banks, are also expected to result in „aggressive deleveraging“ in the coming months - hence the 
need for speedy implementation of the newly proposed additional leverage ratios - which will also 
be crucial to achieving the intended objectives of the new liquidity standards introduced as a result 
of Basel III. 
Just as systemic risks and information asymmetries are issues which constitute the embodiment of 
the rationale for financial regulation, they are also opposite sides of the same coin whose common 
features can be derived as a result of their link with liquidity risks. If information asymmetries 
could be mitigated, to the extent that information were to be complete, accurate and timely – with6
particular emphasis  on timely information,  could liquidity risks be controlled to such an extent 
whereby it would also be possible to manage systemic risks?
As  discussed in  Part  One to  this  paper,  transparency and disclosure  also have  the  potential  to 
generate moral hazard. By correctly discerning who to disseminate information to (the appropriate 
recipients  of  such  information),  the  appropriate  volume  of  information,  as  well  as  when  to 
disseminate  such  information,  moral  hazard,  as  well  as  liquidity  and  systemic  risks  could  be 
effectively managed.
As well as the introduction of measures aimed at consolidating the regulatory capital framework – 
such consolidation focussing on the three pillars of Basel II,  the Basel Committee, through the 
Basel III framework, has also introduced macroprudential elements into the capital framework to 
help  contain  systemic  risks  arising  from procyclicality  and  the  interconnectedness  of  financial 
institutions.7
Having considered how market based regulation could help address liquidity risks (Part One to this
paper), Part Two will commence with a section which considers other factors which should be taken
into account in mitigating liquidity and systemic risks. Section two will then consider recent Basel 
Committee initiatives aimed at addressing capital and liquidity requirements. It will also consider 
efforts aimed at improving the consistency, transparency and comparability of Basel requirements, 
as well as efforts aimed at enhancing risk coverage. The third section will then highlight efforts 
undertaken (and being undertaken) by the Basel Committee to manage systemic risks. This section 
will also incorporate a discussion on the two recently introduced liquidity standards, the Liquidity 
Coverage  Ratio  (LCR)  and the  Net  Stable  Funding Ratio  (NSFR).  This  will  be followed by a 
section  which  draws  attention  to  some  areas  which  constitute  areas  of  focus  in  the  Basel 
5 For further information and cross sectional evidence on the explanation that „falling house prices increased the 
market's trust in a government bailout – thereby increasing market valuations“, see P Posch and G Löffler, „With 
Bail-outs There is No Bad News: Market Reactions to House Price Releases.“ 
6  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework For More Resilient Banks 
and Banking Systems“ at page 9 of 77 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf
7 ibid at page 10 of 77
Committee's efforts to address liquidity risks - before a conclusion is derived in section five.
A. Corporate Governance and Ownership Structures
The potential of banking regulations and disclosure requirements to impact risk taking levels is not
only  dependent  on  the  factors  already mentioned  (dissemination  of  information  to  appropriate 
recipients, appropriate volume of disseminated information, when to disseminate such information),
but also on some other factors such as ownership structures and effective corporate governance 
measures aimed fostering monitoring, supervision and accountability.
I. Accountability, Joint Responsibility and Proportionate Liability
Where a decision is reached by a group of individuals – in contrast to an individual decision, should
this infer a greater scope for accountability or fairness (in the sense that more people will be held 
accountable for the decision) and less scope for injustice (in arriving at that decision)? Baldwin 
argues that even if responsibility for mediation is clearly and uncontentionally allocated, serious 
issues of democratic legitimacy and accountability may still arise.8
His  concept  of  “thick  proceduralisation”,  that  is,  “processes  in  which  mediators  can  play  an 
enabling role by translating the messages and logics of various systems or groups so that others can 
understand and so that communication can be facilitated across different systems and groups” was 
advanced in the hope that parties with differing views could effectively engage in the deliberation 
process.9
As  discussed  in  an  earlier  paper,10 the  likelihood  of  a  qualified  audit  opinion  (as  regards  the 
auditor’s
findings on the financial statements) is considered to be less effective as a deterrent to risk taking by
management – particularly where an individual manager or few managers are held responsible for 
fraudulent related acts. Apportionment of liability on a proportionate basis would produce a more 
equitable result – than in such case where a qualified opinion is issued by the auditor ( where an
individual manager or few managers are held responsible for fraudulent related acts).
The existence of a lead mediator or translator would resolve the problems attributed to lack of
accountability to a large extent – given that such a person would assume joint responsibility and 
liability (even though at a greater proportion than that attributable to other members of the group) 
for  consequences  arising  as  a  result  of  the  group’s  decisions.  Given  that  such  increased 
responsibility is accepted and given that other group members also assume and accept some form of
contributory responsibility for possible consequential liabilities(which accords with proportionate 
increases in the level of fines imposed on each member), members within the group would also 
strive  towards  ensuring  that  decisions  are  taken  with  utmost  level  of  due  diligence  and  that 
members work on a more cooperative basis – rather than a culture of “passing on the buck” to the 
lead mediator/communicator. Where such conditions exist and operate, “clear and uncontentiously
allocated” responsibilities should facilitate accountability and legitimacy.11
8  R Baldwin, “The New Punitive Regulation” May 2004 Volume 67 No 3 Modern Law Review at page 380
9  ibid
10  See M Ojo, „The Role of the External Auditor in Corporate Governance: Agency Problems and the Management of
Risk at page 5 http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/15989/1/MPRA_paper_15989.pdf and
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1427899
11  For further information on this, see M Ojo, „Building on the Trust of Management: Overcoming the Paradoxes of
Principles Based Regulation pages 8 -10 and particularly page 10 http://mpra.ub.unimuenchen.
de/22500/1/MPRA_paper_22500.pdf and http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1600504
II. Impact of Ownership Structures, Bank Regulations and Disclosure Requirements on Risk Taking
In considering the impact of bank regulations and disclosure requirements on risk taking, reference 
will be made to Laeven and Levine's conclusion that whilst the application of bank regulations 
could lead to lower levels of risk taking, they could also induce higher levels of risk taking.12 Lower
levels of risk taking may occur where owners are compelled to invest more of their personal wealth 
in the bank and the converse may occur where capital requirements do not compel owners to invest
more of their wealth in the bank – although they might encourage greater levels of capital to be 
generated.13 However Laeven and Levine add that since the relationship between risk and regulation
is  critically  dependent  on  individual  banks’  ownership  structures,  with  the  effect  that  the 
relationship  between  regulation  and  bank  risk  can  vary  according  to  ownership  structure,  a 
consideration of the impact of ownership structures is necessary in order to present a more accurate
analysis of bank risk taking.14 Further, they illustrate their assertion through a demonstration of how 
ownership  structure  associates  with  bank  regulations  to  impact  the  risk  taking  behaviour  of 
individual banks.15
The theories which were considered in illustrating such an assertion are as follows:16 
* That the effect of regulation on risk is dependent on the relative influence of owners who exist
within governance structures of individual banks;
* That bank regulators influence risk taking incentives of owners in a different manner to those of
managers (banking theory);
* That ownership structures affect the ability of owners to influence risk (corporate governance
theory)17
B. The Need to Address Capital and Liquidity Requirements: The Basel III Framework
Basel III addresses two prudential regulatory tools, namely: capital and liquidity requirements. The 
need  to  address  capital  requirements  is  partly  attributed  to  the  deficiencies  of  Basel  II.  As 
highlighted  under  the  introductory  section,  Basel  II's  internal  credit  risk  models  proved  to  be 
extremely  sensitive.  Furthermore,  the  implementation  of  such  models  generated  pro  cyclical 
effects.18 During the Crisis, several institutions such as Northern Rock had retained even greater 
12  L Laeven and R Levine, ‚Bank Governance, Regulations and Risk Taking’ 2008 Journal of Financial Economics at
page 4
13  See ibid; Also see D Kim and A Santomero, ‚Risk in Banking and Capital Regulation’ 1994 Journal of Finance 43
at 1219-1233
14  L Laeven and R Levine, ‚Bank Governance, Regulations and Risk Taking’ 2008 Journal of Financial Economics at
page 6
15  ibid at page 5
16  For further information on this refer to M Ojo, The Role of External Auditors in Corporate Governance: Agency
Problems and the Management of Risk at pages 2 and 3
17  „By merging the theories, they arrive at the conclusion that: Firstly, owners who have “diversified” their assets have
greater incentives to indulge in higher levels of risk taking than managers who are non shareholders and that as a
result,  banks  which  have  powerful  and  diversified  owners  are  more  likely  to  be  riskier  than  “widely  held  
banks” – provided other factors are constantly maintained. Secondly, bank regulations such as capital requirements 
and  deposit  insurance,  generate  effects  which  differ  when  considered  in  relation  to  incentives  of  owners  as  
opposed to that of managers and that as a result, the “comparative power of shareholders relative to managers  
within each bank’s corporate governance structure” influences the real impact of regulations on risk taking.“;L 
Laeven and R Levine, ‚Bank Governance, Regulations and Risk Taking’ 2008 Journal of Financial Economics at  
page 5
18 Basel II's internal credit risk models were overly sensitive in their implementation for the calculation of regulatory 
levels of capital than that which was required and stipulated under Basel rules – however such 
compliance,  and indeed over  compliance with Basel  capital  requirements,  did not  prevent such 
institutions from encountering the financial difficulties which were experienced during the Crisis.
Basel  III  is  considered  to  be  fundamentally  different  from  Basel  I  and  II  as  a  result  of  its 
combination of „micro and macro prudential reforms to address both institution and system level 
risks.“
Basel III is a combination of an „enhanced Basel II“ as well a „Macro prudential Outlay“.
The enhanced Basel II consists of a micro prudential framework which is aimed at „increasing 
quantity as well as improving the quality of capital, adequate capital charges needed in the trading 
book, enhancing risk management and disclosure, introducing a leverage ratio to supplement risk 
weighted  measures,  and  addressing  counter  party  risk  posed  by  Over-the-Counter  (OTC) 
derivatives.“19
II. Other Recent Basel Committee Initiatives
i) Aimed at Improving Consistency, Transparency and Comparability.
„The  Basel  Committee  leadership  has  acknowledged  that  failing  to  implement  Basel  III  in  a 
globally consistent manner could lead to a competitive race to the bottom and increase risks to the 
global  financial  system.“20 It  is  further  added  that  action  will  be  required  through  the  Basel 
Committee's  Standards  Implementation  Group  (SIG)  –  through  which  initiatives  such  as  peer 
review processes (whereby teams of experts assess the extent to which countries have implemented 
Basel Committee standards) are carried out – such review processes having the potential to „provide 
insight  into  how  approaches  and  outcomes  related  to  the  implementation  of  Basel  III  can  be 
meaningfully monitored and compared.“21
capital (their implementation to facilitate „the derivation of fundamental inputs for formulas which will determine 
the level of capital which large banks must retain.“). „One of the underlying features of the recent Crisis was the 
build-up of excessive on and off balance sheet leverage in the banking system. In many cases, banks built up 
excessive leverage while still showing strong risk based capital ratios. During the most severe part of the Crisis, the 
banking sector was forced by the market to reduce its leverage in a manner that amplified downward pressure on 
asset prices – further exacerbating the positive feedback loop between losses, declines in bank capital, and 
contraction in credit availability.“ See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „Basel III: A Global Regulatory 
Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems“ December 2010 at pages 68-69 of 77 < 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf>
19 The macro prudential aspect addresses „stability over time“ (pro cyclicality) through counter cyclical capital charges 
and forward looking provisioning, as well as capital conservation rules for stronger capital buffers. It also addresses 
„stability  at  each  point  in  time“  (system wide  approach)  through  systemic  capital  surcharges  for  systemically 
important  financial  institutions,  identification  of  interlinkages  and  common  exposures  among  all  financial 
institutions and the systemic oversight of OTC derivatives (CCP infrastructure).
See H Hannoun, „Towards a Global Financial Stability Framework“ Bank for International Settlements Publications 
page 9 of 26 <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp100303.pdf> and also S Walter, „Basel III: Stronger Banks and a More 
Resilient Financial System“ <http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp110406.pdf> at page 3 of 12
20 See testimony by D Tarullo, „Capital and Liquidity Standards“ June 16 2011 
<http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/tarullo20110616a.htm>
 See also , Nout Wellink (2011), "Basel III: A Roadmap to Better Banking Regulation and Supervision," remarks 
delivered at the FSI High-Level Meeting on the New Framework to Strengthen Financial Stability and Regulatory 
Priorities, St. Petersburg, Russia, May; and Stefan Walter (2011), "Basel III: Stronger Banks and a More Resilient 
Financial System," remarks delivered at the Financial Stability Institute Conference on Basel III, Basel, April.
21 „An  international  process  for  monitoring  implementation  on  a  bank-by-bank  basis  has  become  increasingly 
necessary as capital standards have relied to a greater extent on internal market-risk or credit risk models whose 
parameters and opeartion are not transparent“; For further reading see ibid
In response to some of the concerns raised in Part One to this paper – as regards consistency in the
application  of  the  Basel  Committee's  Capital  and  Liquidity  Standards,  the  Committe  has  been 
engaged in efforts aimed at facilitating the comparability and assessment of the quality of capital
between  institutions.  In  order  to  achieve  this  aim,  improved  measures  targeted  at  facilitating 
disclosure – as well as a definition for capital (such definition facilitating greater consistency across
jurisdictions), comprise some of the efforts currently being undertaken.22
Transparency constitutes a vital  issue if  recent  amendments to Pillar  3 of Basel  II  are to  yield 
effective and desired results. Such amendments being aimed at :
− Improving investors' understanding of risk profiles of banks
− Reinforcing bank risk management incentives by allowing market participants to exercise 
discipline.23
The opacity of internal credit risk models also constitutes another issue which regulators need to 
address. It is highlighted that „the opacity of bank balance sheets and their internal risk models“ is 
contributory to the inability to fully understand the reasons for disparities between the calculation of 
risk weighted assets across banks.24
ii) Aimed at Enhancing Risk Coverage
Failure to capture major on- and off-balance sheet risks, as well as derivative related exposures, it is
argued, was a key destabilising factor during the crisis.25
− In response to these shortcomings,  the Committee in  July 2009 completed a  number of 
critical  reforms  to  the  Basel  II  framework  –  such  reforms  aimed  at  increasing  capital 
requirements for the trading book and complex securitisation exposures, a major source of 
losses for many internationally active banks. The enhanced treatment introduces a stressed 
value-at-risk  (VaR)  capital  requirement  based  on  a  continuous  12-month  period  of 
significant  financial  stress.  In  addition,  the  Committee  has  introduced  higher  capital 
requirements for so-called resecuritisations in both the banking and the trading book. The 
reforms also raise the standards of the Pillar 2 supervisory review process and strengthen 
Pillar 3 disclosures.26
22  In facilitating a more consistent definition for capital, „the predominant form of Tier 1 capital must be common 
shares and retained earnings. To improve market discipline, the transparency of the capital base is to be improved, 
with all elements of capital required to be disclosed along with a detailed reconciliation to the reported accounts.
The Committee is introducing these changes in a manner that minimises the disruption to capital instruments that are 
currently outstanding. It will also continue to review the role that contingent capital should play in the regulatory 
capital framework.„ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,  „Basel III:  A Global Regulatory Framework For 
More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems“ at pages 10 - 11 of 77 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf
23 See  Summary  of  Impact  Assessment  Document  amending  Capital  Requirements  Directive  on  Trading  Book, 
Securitization Issues and Remuneration Policies – particularly section 5.3 on „Disclosure of Securitization Risks“ at 
page  5  <http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/summary_en.pdf>;  and  Consultative 
Document of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision „Proposed Enhancements to the Basel II Framework, 
January  2009“  <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs150.pdf>  and  the  finalised  proposals  for  enhancing  the  Basel  II 
framework: „Enhancements to the Basel II Framework“ July 2009 – particularly „Changes to the Pillar 3 Disclosure 
Requirements“ at page 29 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs157.pdf>
24 D Tarullo, „Capital and Liquidity Standards“ June 16 
2011<http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/tarullo20110616a.htm>
25  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework For More Resilient Banks 
and Banking Systems“ at page 11 of 77
26  ibid
Even though the Basel Committee's determination of risk-weights and capital charges, and indeed
the risk weighting process have been questioned,27  initiatives in other areas (such initiatives aimed
at mitigating pro cyclicality and promoting countercyclical buffers), as well as efforts aimed at
facilitating macro prudential supervision have received more positive responses.28
C. Efforts Undertaken by the Basel Committee to Contain Systemic Risks
i) Initiatives Relating to Capital Requirements
Mitigating Procyclicality and Promoting Countercyclical Buffers
In collaboration with the Financial Stability Board, the Basel Committee has been developing a
„well integrated approach to systemically important financial institutions which could include
combinations of capital surcharges, contingent capital and bail-in debt“.29
Some measures which will be introduced by the Basel Committee in its aim to make banks „more
resilient to procyclical dynamics – as well as helping to ensure that the banking sector serves as a
shock absorber,  instead  of  a  transmitter  of  risk  to  the  financial  system and broader  economy“ 
include:30
− Leverage ratios:31
The Committee agreed to introduce a simple, transparent, non-risk based leverage ratio that 
is  calibrated  to  act  as  a  credible  supplementary  measure  to  the  risk  based  capital  
requirements. The leverage ratio is intended to achieve the objectives of constraining the  
build-up of leverage in the banking sector, helping avoid destabilising deleveraging
processes which can damage the broader financial system and the economy; and reinforcing
the risk based requirements with a simple, non-risk based “backstop” measure.
27  See H Scott, „Reducing Systemic Risk Through the Reform of Capital Regulation“Journal of International
Economic Law 13(3), 763–778 at page 5 of 16
28  Amongst other initiatives undertaken by the Committee, are those which include the assessment of measures aimed
at:
− Mitigating the the reliance on external ratings of the Basel II framework. The measures include requirements
for banks to perform their own internal assessments of externally rated securitisation exposures, the
elimination of certain “cliff effects” associated with credit risk mitigation practices, and the incorporation of
key elements of the IOSCO Code of Conduct Fundamentals for Credit Rating Agencies into the Committee’s
eligibility criteria for the use of external ratings in the capital framework.
− Supplementing the risk-based capital requirement with a leverage ratio. One of the underlying features of the 
crisis was the build up of excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage in the banking system. See Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision, „Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework For More Resilient Banks 
and Banking Systems“ at page 12 of 77
29  ibid at page 15 of 77
30  See ibid at page 13 of 77
31  „One of the underlying features of the crisis was the build-up of excessive on- and off-balance sheet leverage in the
banking system. In many cases, banks built up excessive leverage while still showing strong risk based capital 
ratios. During the most severe part of the crisis, the banking sector was forced by the market to reduce its leverage in a  
manner that  amplified downward pressure on asset prices,  further exacerbating the positive feedback loop between 
losses, declines in bank capital, and contraction in credit availability. „ibid at page 68 -69 of 77
Measures aimed at addressing procyclicality and raising the resilience of the banking sector
in good times. Key objectives of these measures being: to dampen any excess cyclicality of
the minimum capital requirement; promote more forward looking provisions; conserve
capital to build buffers at individual banks and the banking sector that can be used in stress;
and to achieve the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from
periods of excess credit growth.“
ii) Initiatives Relating to Liquidity  Requirements
Whilst the introduction of  the „simple, transparent, non-risk based leverage ratios“ are intended to 
act as a credible supplementary measure to the risk based capital requirements, they will also play 
crucial roles in relation to the two new liquidity standards as will be demonstrated in the course of 
this section. 
Two new liquidity requirements were introduced as a result of Basel III – this being a significant 
step in the Basel Committee's efforts to address liquidity risks given the fact that this is the first time 
liquidity standards will be introduced. The two new liquidity standards are:
− The Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)
− The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR)
The Liquidity Coverage Ratio imposes a  requirement  that  banks maintain an adequate  level of 
„unencumbered, high-quality liquid assets that can be converted to cash to meet needs for a 30 
calendar day time horizon under severe liquidity stress conditions specified by supervisors“ 
whilst
The Net Stable Funding Ratio Standard is designed to „promote longer-term funding of the assets 
and activities of banking organizations by establishing a minimum acceptable amount of stable 
funding based on the liquidity of an institution's assets and activities over a one-year horizon.“32 
In relation to the new liquidity standards, it could be said that the second standard, that is the Net 
Stable Funding Ratio, is more likely to facilitate a situation where assets become concentrated and 
susceptible to sovereign exposures. The new additional leverage ratios which are to be introduced 
by the Basel Committee, should help in facilitating the diversification of liquid assets.
D.  Identified Areas which Constitute Focus in Relation to Liquidity Risks
Such identified areas include:33
(i) Contractual maturity mismatch:
„To gain an understanding of the basic aspects of a bank’s liquidity needs, banks should  
frequently conduct a contractual maturity mismatch assessment. This metric provides an
initial, simple baseline of contractual commitments and is useful in comparing liquidity risk
32 See Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „Consultative Document, International Framework for Liquidity 
Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring“ December 2009 at page 3 (ii of 44) 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs165.pdf>
33  Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework For More Resilient Banks 
and Banking Systems“ at page 18 of 77
profiles across institutions, and to highlight to both banks and supervisors when potential
liquidity needs could arise.
(ii) Concentration of funding:
This metric involves analysing concentrations of wholesale funding provided by specific  
counterparties, instruments and currencies. A metric covering concentrations of wholesale  
funding assists supervisors in assessing the extent to which funding liquidity risks could
occur in the event that one or more of the funding sources are withdrawn.
(iii)Available unencumbered assets:
This  metric  measures  the  amount  of  unencumbered  assets  a  bank  has  which  could  
potentially be used as collateral  for secured funding either in the market or at standing  
central  bank facilities.  This  should  make  banks  (and  supervisors)  more  aware  of  their  
potential  capacity to  raise  additional  secured  funds,  keeping in  mind that  in  a  stressed  
situation this ability may decrease.
(iv) LCR by currency:
In recognition that foreign exchange risk is a component of liquidity risk, the LCR should 
also be assessed in each significant currency, in order to monitor and manage the overall
level and trend of currency exposure at a bank.
(v) Market-related monitoring tools:
In order to have a source of instantaneous data on potential liquidity difficulties, useful data
to  monitor  includes  market-wide  data  on  asset  prices  and  liquidity,  institution-related  
information such as credit default swap (CDS) spreads and equity prices, and additional  
institution-specific information related to the ability of the institution to fund itself in various 
wholesale funding markets and the price at which it can do so.“
In  relation  to  transitional  arrangements,34 the  Committee  is  introducing  such  arrangements  „to 
implement the new standards that help ensure that the banking sector can meet the higher capital 
standards through reasonable earnings retention and capital raising, while still supporting lending to
the  economy.“35  Both  the  Liquidity  Coverage  Ratio  (LCR)  and  the  Net  Stable  Funding 
34  For further information on transitional arrangements and scope of application (page 2/ page 8 of 53), monitoring 
tools relating to contractual maturity mismatch, concentration of funding, available unencumbered assets and market 
related monitoring tools (31-38), and application issues for standards (pages 38 – 40) see Basel III: International 
Framework for Liquidity Risk Measurement, Standards and Monitoring <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs188.pdf>
35   „After an observation period beginning in 2011, the LCR will be introduced on 1 January 2015. The NSFR will 
move to a minimum standard by 1 January 2018. The Committee will put in place rigorous reporting processes to 
monitor the ratios during the transition period and will continue to review the implications of these standards for 
Ratio(NSFR) are to be subject to an observation period and will include a review clause to address 
any unintended consequences.36
E. Conclusion
Whilst immense efforts and initiatives have been promulgated by the Basel Committe (in relation to
systemic and liquidity risks), responses to its introduction of capital standards and its initiatives in 
relation to the control of systemic risks remain more positive than those which relate to liquidity 
standards and metrics. As highlighted under the first part to this paper, criticisms relating to the 
Basel Committee's liquidity risk measurements include the failure to „factor in“ the role of central 
banks  as  lenders  of   last  resort.  Challenges  faced  by Basel  III  ,  which  include  the restrictions 
imposed upon it by the Dodd Frank Act,  which even though similar to Basel III in several respects 
(for example, its requirement of more stringent capital and liquidity standards, a non risk leverage 
ratio),  prohibits  US regulators  from relying  on external  credit  ratings  in  any regulation  –  thus 
„making  the  implementation  of  Basel  reforms  relating  to  securitization  and  resecuritizations 
impossible,“37 could  be  attributed  to  questions  surrounding  the  Basel  Committee's  metrics  in 
determining risk weights, as well as the reliability of credit ratings as means of determining risk 
weights, these being recurring topics since the occurrence of the recent Crisis.
The conclusion derived from the first part to this paper, as well as certain observations raised in the 
present paper, can only lead to an inferral that greater focus on market based regulation, greater 
focus  on  initiatives  and  incentives  aimed  at  deterring  management  from  taking  undue  and 
unneccessary risks (including improved corporate governance measures and practices), constitute 
some  vital  factors  which  should  be  taken  into  consideration  if  liquidity  and  (consequentially) 
systemic risks are to be effectively controlled and managed.
As highlighted under Part One to the paper,38 „the monitoring of useful data – information such as 
market-wide data on asset prices and liquidity, institution related information such as credit default 
swap (CDS) spreads  and equity prices,  additional  institution-specific  information related  to  the 
ability of an institution to fund itself in various wholesale funding markets and the price at which it 
can do so, will be vital in obtaining a source of instantaneous data on potential liquidity problems.“
financial markets, credit extension and economic growth, addressing unintended consequences as necessary. „
36  „No additional work was done on the impact of stronger liquidity requirements in this report, in view of the fact that
the liquidity requirements are still subject to an observation period. The Liquidity Coverage Ratio will be introduced 
in 2015 and the Net Stable Funding Ratio in 2018. The estimates for the impact of these measures provided in the 
Interim Report assume a shorter implementation period than that agreed to by the BCBS, and can therefore be 
viewed as conservative estimates. „ See the Final Report of the Macroeconomic Assessment Group (established by
the Financial Stability Board and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision) „Assessing the Macroeconomic
Impact of the Transition to Stronger Capital and Liquidity Requirements, Bank for International Settlement
Publications December 2010.
37 See Speech by Stefan Walter, Secretary General of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision at the Risk Europe 
Pre Conference Summit, Brussels 4 April 2011.For further information on the reliability and accuracy of credit 
rating agencies – particularly their role in the recent global financial Crisis, as well as their ability to „adjust their 
ratings prior to impairments of structured finance transactions“, see M Bodenstedt, D Rösch and H Scheule,“ The 
Path to Impairment: Are Structured Finance Ratings Perspicacious?“ . See also M Lingo, A Eisl and H Elendner, 
„Re-Mapping Credit Ratings“
38 See M Ojo, „Preparing for Basel IV – Why Liquidity Risks Still Present a Challenge to Regulators in Prudential 
Supervision (II); and also Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, „Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework 
for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems“ at page 18 of 17 <http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf>
Until additional leverage ratios are implemented39 and coupled with the new liquidity standards, 
these standards will probably not achieve a significant extent of their desired effects – since liquid 
assets  could  be  accumulated  through  these  standards  –  such  as  to  an  extent  where  they  are 
susceptible to sovereign exposures.
The additional leverage ratios to be introduced by the Basel Committee will play vital roles by:
Helping to facilitate the diversification of assets – liquid assets in particular (and with respect to the 
new liquidity standards); and
Helping to avoid the present consequential effects of Basel III – where banks, in an aim to achieve 
regulatory capital and leverage ratio requirements, are compelled into a situation where aggressive 
de leverage occurs.
Leverage ratios are therefore required in order to stabilise40 the financial system where deleveraging 
(and particularly “aggressive deleveraging”) results in the de stabilisation of the financial system. In 
essence, Basel III will be expected to rectify problems attributed to aggressive deleveraging - which 
could be generated as a result of its implementation.
39 The Committee is introducing various changes in a manner that minimises the disruption to capital instruments that 
are currently outstanding. It will also continue to review the role that contingent capital should play in the regulatory 
capital framework.„ Basel Committee on Banking Supervision,  „Basel III:  A Global Regulatory Framework For 
More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems“ at pages 10 - 11 of 77 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf
40  Also see N Papanikolaou and C Wolff„ Leverage and Risk in US Commercial Banking in the Light of the Recent 
Financial Crisis“ Paper presented at the INFINITI Conference on International Finance13-14 June 2011. Results of 
this paper are intended to „provide a better understanding of the role of leverage in de stabilising the entire system 
whilst contributing to the current discussion on the resilience of the banking sector through a consolidation of the 
existing regulatory framework.“  In arguing that additional leverage ratios which have recently been proposed by the 
Basel Committee will play a key role in facilitating the diversification of banks‘ liquid assets – via the new liquidity 
standards (Liquidity Coverage Ratio and the Net Stable Funding Ratio), contribution is also made to the current 
discussion on the resilience of the banking sector – albeit from the perspective of the stabilisation of the entire 
system.
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